Syria:
Challenges and Political Transition - Alia Mansour
The word
"challenges" seems almost trivial compared to what Syria is facing
today after the fall of the Assad regime, which ruled Syria with an iron fist
for more than 54 years, and nearly after 14 years of war launched by Bashar
al-Assad against the Syrians following the outbreak of their revolution.
Regardless of whether
we call what the new Syria is facing as challenges, difficulties, or
obligations, it remains that there is much that requires exceptional efforts on
both internal and external fronts. Some of these tasks require many years,
while others cannot afford to be postponed or delayed. In this article, I will
focus on the internal "challenges."
Just a few hours after
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the opposition factions entered Damascus, Israel
intensified its strikes on various military sites across Syria. It did not stop
at violating Syrian sovereignty but also conducted a ground incursion, seizing
new territories in southern Syria near the capital, Damascus, under the pretext
of protecting its borders. While some may not give this development the
attention it deserves, it will create a social and political pressure factor on
the new authority, which lacks the capacity to confront the Israeli military
incursion or to accept it as a fait accompli. It will have no choice but to
resort to diplomatic pressure tactics, of which it currently possesses very few
tools.
The second and most
dangerous challenge is the security challenge. The security vacuum resulting
from the rapid collapse of Assad's forces and the police force could not be
filled quickly enough by relying on the security agencies operating in Idlib
and northern Syria. Additionally, the spread of weapons among the
"military factions" loyal to the revolution, with their differing
orientations, as well as the proliferation of arms among former regime elements
and their militias, all contribute to a fragile security situation. It is true
that the process of settling the status of former regime elements began in the
early days following its collapse and the escape of President Bashar al-Assad,
but those who have been and are carrying out these settlements are mostly
individuals who do not hold high-ranking positions and do not consider that the
revolution has ended the state of bullying over society and the state and its
resources, which they have relied on for decades.
The same applies to the
process of forming the new army, which practically began with the factions
starting to hand over their weapons to the Ministry of Defense and preparing
for the integration of their members and leaders into this army. However, there
are still difficulties ahead, including the situation in the eastern regions
and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), about which conflicting information
persists even as this text is being written regarding their acceptance to
integrate into the army as individuals rather than as a faction, as they had
previously demanded. What applies to the SDF and the Kurdish component also
applies to Sweida, which has a Druze majority, where some factions refuse to
hand over their weapons and integrate into the army under the pretext of the
"specificity" of the governorate, while others are waiting for the
formation of a government that represents all Syrians with their political and
sectarian orientations. We shall not forget that Syrian President Ahmad
al-Shara is facing the challenge of the remnants of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham,
which dissolved itself at the Victory Conference. Al-Shara's moderate rhetoric
contradicts the orientations of some, and some members of the organization
still believe in the approach of al-Julani and reject al-Shara's approach and
policies.
In this fragile
security phase, "ISIS" has re-emerged, whether this "ISIS"
is independent or operates under the command of certain countries that are
dissatisfied with what has happened in Syria, it remains a highly dangerous
security challenge. This situation requires cooperation and coordination with
regional and international intelligence agencies. Coordination has begun with
some countries, while others reject it; one could even say they benefit from
the chaos in Syria.
If we acknowledge that
the fall of the Assad regime and the loss of the resistance axis in Syria
represents a fall for Iran's expansionist project, which began with Khomeini's first
arrival in Tehran, following its resounding defeat in Lebanon due to the
support war launched by Hezbollah in support of Gaza, we realize that Iran will
not accept this defeat and will not stand idly by. It has already begun to act
through its militias along the Syrian-Lebanese border and in the Syrian coast
and Homs, where the Alawite community is most concentrated.
These security
challenges and difficulties, if things spiral out of control, pose the greatest
threat to the transitional phase in Syria. While some believe that no one has
an interest in destabilizing the region today and starting new wars, others
have different interests and calculations.
The third challenge is
the very poor economic situation, which cannot improve before lifting the
sanctions imposed on Syria. The countries in concern stipulate the launch of a political process
that include all Syrians in order to lift the majority of these sanctions.
However, who can guarantee that this condition will not turn into a form of
political blackmail? Will the process proceed in parallel, or as it is known,
step by step? Syria needs a massive reconstruction effort so that displaced
Syrians around the world can return and participate in the political,
reconstruction, and developmental processes. All these matters are
interconnected, and any disruption or shortcoming will generate further
obstacles in the other files.
The transition to a
democratic Syria and to citizenship countries is a long process that will
require effort and years of work. However, this process cannot begin on solid
foundations unless citizens feel an improvement in their living conditions and
a sense of security in their country.
Alia Mansour
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