Nov 15, 2024
Tunisia's Political Environment

Tunisia's Political Environment



After the Arab Spring, Tunisia got on a transitional track surrounded by political conflict over priorities, which could be summarized by the form of the state, the nature of the regime, the economic vision, and ways to respond to people's needs. Opinions were divided between supporters of the parliamentary and presidential systems. The division also extended to the electoral law. The economy, the role of the state, and the relationship with the private sector formed the focus of the dialogue between the concerned parties. However, the private sector in the country practiced political corruption, benefiting from its relations with the regime and the facilities it received to conclude deals and evade taxes. After the Revolution, the "cronies" were able to smuggle money abroad, plunging the country into a stifling economic crisis. Also among the sharp differences was defining the relationship with Islamic law and its role in legislation until the first constitution settled this point, considering it one of many sources of legislation. This debate resulted in a division between the Islamic Ennahda Movement on one side and the liberal and leftist political parties on the other.


On the Political Level


The country entered a political crisis due to the governance crisis with the election of Kais Saied as President of the Republic. Saied was elected after a government crisis that led to the suspension of constitutional institutions, which plunged the country into stifling political and economic disarray. Tunisians disagreed on who was responsible. Some believed the transitional phase after the Arab Spring did not build effective institutions capable of shifting towards the desired democratic and modern state. Others held the Ennahda Movement responsible for attempting to seize power through democratic tools and transform Tunisia into an Islamic republic governed by Sharia law. The elected president worked to suspend the constitution per the provisions of Constitutional Article 54, which gives him limited and temporary powers. However, he extended those powers for years under the pretext of Tunisia's political impasse to gain popular support, especially among the youth.


On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued a presidential edict allowing him to issue texts of a legislative nature in the form of decrees that he personally seals and authorizes their publication in the Official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic. Thus, he concentrated powers after assuming the duties of the legislative authority alongside the executive. All these decisions were taken as "exceptional measures" in light of the economic, social, and health deterioration in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. As a result of the unilateral decisions, a stormy political crisis erupted in the country, the repercussions of which continue to this day due to the violation of the principle of separation of powers.


In the path adopted, the steps and procedures can be framed as follows:


In a speech on December 13, 2021, President Kais Saied addressed the Tunisian people concerning the final suspension of the parliament's powers until new legislative elections were held, officially scheduled for December 17, 2022.

On March 30, 2022, the 2019 parliament was officially dissolved by a presidential decree issued by Saied after the "frozen" council attempted to cancel the exceptional measures.

On July 25, 2022, a referendum was held on the new Tunisian constitution, which was described as an attempt to change the country's political system from parliamentary to presidential. On June 30, 2022, President Kais Saied issued the first draft of Tunisia's new constitution, known in the media as the "Constitution of the New Republic." Tunisian voters were also called to vote "yes" to the draft constitution.

On July 26, 2022, the Independent High Commission for Elections (Elections Commission) announced the preliminary results of the referendum, indicating its approval by a majority of 94.6 percent of votes, representing 30.5 percent of the total registered voters. In August of the same year, after the end of the legal appeals period, Saied sealed the new constitution and ordered its entry into force.

In August 2023, Tunisian President Kais Saied announced without prior warning that he had decided to end Prime Minister Najla Bouden's duties and appoint Ahmed Hachani as her successor. Bouden is the first female prime minister since the political system in Tunisia changed from parliamentary to presidential. Her unjustified dismissal demonstrated President Saied's monopoly over the country's political powers. He neither explained his decision nor mentioned any shortcomings in the dismissed prime minister's performance or handling of her responsibilities.


These measures were subject to sharp, widespread criticism. Tunisian forces of all stripes saw it as a coup against the revolution, the constitution, and "the consecration of absolute individual rule."


In parallel with monopolizing decisions, Saied employed the state's administrative, security, and judicial apparatus to pursue and harass his opponents. Many political figures were arrested and referred to military courts on charges related to their political activities. Journalists and bloggers also were harassed, and some were thrown in prison on charges of "harming the president's prestige." A presidential decree imposed harsh penalties on activities related to freedom of expression and the exchange of information. Public media outlets were banned from hosting party representatives and covering opposition activities, prompting many opponents to leave the country and seek refuge in France or other safer countries, escaping the yoke of tyranny practiced by Kais Saied in Tunisia.


On the Economy and Livelihoods


Clearly, the promises made by Saied were not based on objective data. The economic crisis worsened, the Tunisian Dinar's value declined, and markets suffered a shortage of consumer goods and fuel and an unprecedented rise in prices. Many essential medicines were no longer available, and subsidies on food commodities, water, and electricity were gradually lifted. These failures and practices have led to the decline of the political and popular incubator initially swept up by the president’s populist rhetoric. Finally, the opposition front against his policies expanded.


According to a study by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in February 2024:


With the current democratic backsliding, Tunisia has lost the “democratic rent” that allowed it to gain access to cheap and plentiful financial assistance from Western partners and institutions. For all its efforts, Tunisia has not managed in the past two years to attract large enough funds from new sources to make an economic difference. Since 2022, it has attracted only $500 million in Saudi financial assistance, a $200 million loan ($100 million of which was deposited in the Tunisian central bank) from Algeria, and $330 million (€300 million) in macro financial assistance from the EU.


In October 2022, the Tunisian authorities and the IMF agreed to grant the country a $1.9 billion loan. However, Saied rejected the IMF's conditions, describing them as "external dictates" that would only increase poverty. The World Bank has temporarily suspended its program to support Tunisia’s budget in 2022 and suspended discussions on future cooperation with Tunisia after Saied’s comments on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa sparked a wave of racially motivated harassment and violence in March 2023. Meanwhile, EU funding has become scarce, with additional financial support largely conditional on Tunisia’s acceptance of an IMF program.


The EU tried to link its willingness to provide financial assistance to Tunisia to its efforts to strengthen a partnership to reduce the flow of migrants across its borders. It is in the EU’s interest to maintain Tunisia’s stability and curb the migration of African citizens to European shores. Due to the increasing number of migrants seeking to enter Europe via Tunisia, the EU has softened its stance on governance issues and human rights violations in the country. 


In July 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, under which it would provide 900 million euros ($980 million) in financial assistance to the Tunisian economy as a loan, provided that the country reached an agreement with the IMF. The package included financial assistance worth 150 million euros ($160 million) to be injected into the 2023 budget to strengthen economic relations and trade exchange, support clean and renewable energy, and enhance cooperation between peoples through several projects. A financial package worth 105 million euros ($115 million) aimed to combat irregular migration. The delay in implementing the agreement led to a sharp increase in the rate of illegal migration from the Tunisian coast, which appeared to be a deliberate move to put more pressure on the EU to show greater flexibility and ease the conditions that Tunisia must meet to move forward with the agreement.



Disagreements between EU member states in the Council of Europe have delayed the rapid transformation of the MoU into a concrete agreement to help revive the Tunisian economy, creating tensions with the Tunisian authorities. In October 2023, Saied announced his rejection of the financial aid that the EU had decided to grant his country. Separating the association agreement with the EU from the deal with the IMF has become a fundamental pillar of Tunisia’s strategy. This effort has been rejected by EU countries, which believe that increased funding should be linked to reforms. Separating the two issues would turn funding into geopolitical rent that could encourage Tunisia and other countries south of Europe to use migrant flows as leverage.

In conclusion, since President Kais Saied's coup against the constitution, Tunisia has witnessed an expansion in the opposition front and a contraction in the president's social and political incubator. The situation was due to the exacerbating economic and living crisis, coupled with the return to police repression and the use of state agencies against dissenters. Another reason was the president’s monopoly on power and refusal to ally even with the parties that supported his coup. The expansion is demonstrated in the growth of protest movements, political and issue-based, the opposition’s ability to mobilize (such as the demonstrations in September 2024), and the widespread boycott of electoral dates, such as the referendum on the constitution and parliamentary and local elections.

The National Action Network to Defend Democracy emerged amid those tensions. It called for the September marches in the capital, Tunis, to continue and escalate pressures until the people's will is imposed on the president to ensure democracy. The Network was formed by several opposition political parties and NGOs. However, the president continued to follow the same approach since July 2021, dispensing with popular support in favor of the continued support of the security apparatus and the army.



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