The
Shifting Landscape of Syrian Refugee Crisis: Implications of Recent Changes and
the Path to Organized Return - Khalil Gebara
It has been argued that displacement in Syria was not solely a
consequence of war but also a deliberate strategy. The Assad regime employed
demographic engineering as a tool to reshape both the population and the
landscape of Syria. Consequently, the recent political upheaval—marked by the
fall of the Assad regime after years of brutal conflict—has ushered in a new
era of uncertainty and opportunity for millions of Syrians, both within the
country and dispersed across the globe. This significant shift in the political
landscape has reignited debates over the structure and functions of political
institutions, the economy, the public sector, the framework of a new
constitution, and various forms of pluralism and representation. At the same
time, it has raised questions about whether a positive resolution of the
refugee issue is achievable by facilitating the return of Syrians to their
homeland. According to UNHCR, more than 14 million people were forced to flee
their homes during the Syrian civil war, with approximately 7.4 million
internally displaced and the remainder seeking refuge in neighboring countries
and beyond, among them 5.5 million in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.[1]
This article delves into the implications of these changes, examining the
evolving dynamics of refugee return, analyzing factors influencing repatriation
decisions, and exploring strategies for establishing an organized return
process—specifically focusing on Lebanon.
When do refugee Crises Come to an End?
Although today's conflicts take different shapes and dynamics, and as a result, some conflicts might never be resolved, the optimal solution for refugee displacement has always been to return in safety and dignity to their homeland compared to other options such as third-country resettlement or residing indefinitely in host countries. For example, less than 1% of refugees worldwide received citizenship in the host country over the last decade, and 1 to 2% were resettled.[2]
The most common type of return is voluntary assisted return, which means the voluntary repatriation of refugees in safety and dignity organized by UNHCR and assisted by international support.[3] These organized returns are complex logistically and operationally. In most cases, they require tripartite agreements between UNHCR, the host country, and the country of origin. The decision of refugees to return home is influenced by a complex interplay of push and pull factors. These factors vary depending on individual circumstances, family ties, and the host and home country conditions. The determinants of return according to international experiences are:[4]
- Peace, security, and protection,
- Livelihoods and access to employment
- Housing, land, and property,
- Infrustructure and service
- and the role of international assistance.
The Syrian regime under Assad has introduced plenty of obstacles and
factors that actively drove refugees away from considering returning to their
towns and villages. Key measures and policies were:
- Law No. 10: Introduced in 2018, this law allowed the government to seize private property for urban development, requiring property owners to prove ownership within a short window or risk forfeiture. Many refugees, unable to secure their property rights from abroad, witnessed the potential loss of their homes and lands, discouraging their return.
- Security Clearances: Returning refugees were required to obtain security clearances. This arbitrary process deterred returns due to fears of arrest, detention, or forced conscription. Many reports emerged of refugees being detained or disappeared after their return.
- Mandatory Military Service: Men of conscription age faced the risk of being drafted into military service upon return, which was a significant deterrent given the harsh conditions and ongoing conflict within military ranks.
- Surveillance and Restrictions: The regime maintained a tight grip on repatriated areas, often imposing strict surveillance and control, limiting freedom of movement, and creating an atmosphere of fear and repression.
- The $100 Fee: The Assad
regime imposed a $100 fee that required Syrian citizens, including
refugees returning to the country, to pay it upon re-entry.
All of these obstacles and restrictions became obsolete with the
toppling of the Assad regime. However, the challenges remain immense. The cost
of rebuilding Syria alone is estimated at between $250 billion and $400
billion. According to a recent UNESCWA study, Syria's GDP has contracted
by 64 percent since the war began in 2011. The Syrian pound lost approximately
two-thirds of its value against the dollar in 2023, pushing inflation to an
estimated 40.2 percent in 2024. Meanwhile, the country remains under heavy
sanctions, financially blacklisted, and dependent on aid, with 16.7 million
Syrians in need of assistance – more than half of whom face food insecurity.[5]
Lebanon hosts around 1,479,000 registered and recorded refugees as
of 31 December 2024.[6]
Today, the push/pull factors that influence their decision to return to Syria
can be summarized in the following table:
|
Push Factors |
Pull Factors |
|
Economic Hardship: Limited
access to employment, low wages, and expensive cost of living. |
Improved Security: Perceptions
of increased safety and stability in certain areas of Syria. |
|
Social Exclusion: Experiences
of discrimination and social exclusion. |
Family Ties: Strong
desire to reunite with family members in Syria. |
|
Lack of Legal Status: Lack of
secure legal status and residency increases vulnerability. |
Homesickness and Belonging: A sense of belonging
and a desire to return to one's roots. |
|
Limited Access to Services: Challenges
in accessing essential services such as healthcare and education. |
Reclaiming Property and Livelihoods: Desire to
reclaim properties or businesses in Syria. |
|
Political Pressure: Active
encouragement or pressure to return. |
Rebuilding Syria: A sense of
responsibility to contribute to the country's reconstruction. |
|
Misinformation and Lack of Trust: Uncertainty
and lack of reliable information about the situation in Syria. |
Economic Opportunities: The Syrian government's
interest in the return of skilled professionals and students to contribute to
rebuilding the country. |
When Will the Syrian Refugees Return?
According to recent findings, the conditions in Syria play a more
important role in shaping refugees' return intentions than conditions in
Lebanon. The findings also suggest that safety and security are the most
significant drivers for return.[7]
According to the UNHCR Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees'
Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria, 27% of refugees in
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon intend to return to Syria in the next 12 months,
whereas the number was 1.7% in 2024. According to the same survey, 60% of
refugees prefer to carry out a "go and see visit" before deciding on
return. In contrast, the main barriers to return are economic conditions, lack
of basic services, and the status of available housing.[8]
According to UNHCR estimates, 270,000 Syrians have returned to
their homeland following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.
Considering the vast number of Syrian refugees dispersed globally, this
repatriation could become one of the largest such operations in recent decades.
Therefore, this return must be meticulously organized and structured to
safeguard the lives of the returnees and to ensure that the conditions for
Syrians who remained do not deteriorate. The following could be considered key
policy priorities to safeguard the operation of Syrian refugees returning from
Lebanon:
Signing a Tripartite Agreement: A tripartite agreement between the UNHCR, Lebanon, and the new authorities in Syria should be signed.
This agreement must clearly define the roles of the different parties, address pending legal issues, and enhance coordination and cooperation among the concerned parties. The reference in the Lebanese new government's ministerial statement to the need to initiate dialogue with the new Syrian authorities to resolve the refugee crisis is a promising step forward.
Arranging Go-and-See Visits: Most refugees base their decisions to return on organized Go-and-See visits. These visits help assess the security situation, availability of services, infrastructure, and livelihoods, aiding refugees in making an informed decision regarding their return.
Increasing Funding Opportunities: The active involvement of the international community is crucial in supporting Syrian refugees' safe and sustainable return. This support includes providing financial and technical assistance, promoting regional cooperation, easing sanctions such as the recent decisions by the European Union and the temporary waiver by the American administration, and advocating for the protection of refugees. One of the key areas where international support is needed is the prioritization of funding for housing, education, and health programs for areas from which returnees originate.
Conclusion
The fall of the Assad regime has created a new and complex
landscape for the return of Syrian refugees. While the potential for
repatriation has increased, significant challenges remain. It is crucial to
prioritize the safe and organized return of refugees while taking into
consideration the ongoing security challenges, the devastated economy, and the
limited access to essential services in Syria.
As a primary host country, Lebanon faces significant challenges in
managing refugee returns, including strained resources and the lack of a clear
legal framework to manage the refugee crisis. However, by implementing
strategies such as organizing "go and see" visits, strengthening
collaboration and cooperation by signing a tripartite agreement with UNHCR and
the new Syrian authorities, and advocating to prioritize funding for areas
where refugees originate from, Lebanon can positively contribute to one of the most
extensive repatriation campaigns in recent decades.
Khalil
Gebara
[2] Alrababah, A., Masterson, D., Casalis, M., Hangartner, D.,
& Weinstein, J. (2023). The dynamics of refugee return: Syrian refugees and
their migration intentions. British Journal of Political Science, 53, 1108–1131, p,
1109.
[3] https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/build-better-futures/long-term-solutions/voluntary-repatriation
[4] World Bank. 2020. The
Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis. Washington, DC:
World Bank, p.54.
[7] Alrababah,
A., Masterson, D., Casalis, M., Hangartner, D., & Weinstein, J. (2023). The
dynamics of refugee return: Syrian refugees and their migration intentions. British Journal of Political Science, 53,
1108–1131, p, 1112.
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