COP29 Fails to Mobilize Funding and Global Efforts to Save the Climate - Habib Maalouf
COP29 Fails to Mobilize Funding and Global
Efforts to Save the Climate -
This year’s COP29 climate summit in Baku was widely expected to fail in mobilizing the international funding needed to tackle climate change. The Baku Summit brought together heads of state and government officials from more than 100 countries to discuss how wealthier nations can support vulnerable countries in reducing carbon emissions, shifting from fossil fuels to clean energy, and preparing for climate-related disasters. The first indicator of failure was the absence of the leaders of the thirteen countries with the highest carbon emissions, responsible for more than 70 percent of global emissions (according to the latest assessment in 2023), and which were supposed to pay and compensate developing countries according to the Framework Convention on Climate Change concluded in 1992.
The
conference was extended for two days. As the heads of delegations started going
back to their countries and fearing that the quorum (two-thirds of the
signatories to the climate agreements) would be lost, the conference president,
Mukhtar Babayev, rushed to strike his gavel, in accord with some influential
rich countries. He announced a final text on the collective quantitative goal
for financing, where developed countries would pay $300 billion to developing
countries to finance their energy transition by 2035.
The
announcement sparked protests from developing countries, led by India, whose
representatives were the first to stand in opposition. It came after successive
protests in the second week of negotiations in objection to multiple texts. The
bazaar had reached $250 billion, to be quickly rejected by developing
countries, which estimated the need at $1 trillion by 2030 and $1.3 trillion by
2035. During the negotiations, developed countries acknowledged the need for
$700 billion. However, they said they could not exceed $300 billion annually,
especially with the arrival of President Trump to the White House, who is known
for his rejectionist stance and previous threat to withdraw from the Paris
Climate Agreement. It was repeatedly claimed that rich countries could not pay
these vast amounts required from their budgets. Thus, they resorted at the G20
summit to demanding a wealth tax, which would also involve the private sector
in the financing process.
Nevertheless,
a new obstacle emerged. Many circles participating in the negotiations confirm
that this money will only be in the form of loans or (profit-seeking)
investments. However, this method contradicts climate agreements, the 1992
framework agreement, and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which consider this
financing a duty for developed countries towards developing countries and must
be paid as compensation, not as new loans and debts.
On
the other hand, the Baku Climate Summit's final statement confirmed that the
new collective quantitative goal on climate finance aims to accelerate the
achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The article calls for holding
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. It recognizes that
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change,
increase the ability to adapt to its adverse effects, enhance the capacity to
adapt to climate and low-emission development without threatening food
production, and make finance flows consistent with the path towards low-emission
and climate-resilient development.
COP29's
final statement also emphasized the results of the first global stocktaking
process, stressing the urgent need to enhance ambition and action to address
gaps in implementing the Paris Agreement. The statement recognized the needs
reported in the nationally determined contributions of developing countries,
estimated at 5.1 to 6.8 trillion US dollars until 2030. It also noted that the
IPCC report estimated that global financing to address climate change will
amount to US$ 455-584 billion annually, and adaptation financing needs are
estimated at US$ 215-387 billion annually until 2030. It also acknowledged the
gap between climate finance flows and adaptation needs in developing countries.
A
paragraph was added to the statement calling on all actors to work together to
enable increased financing for developing country parties for climate action
from all public and private sources to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by
2035. It was meant to appease developing countries that objected to the
low-funding proposals. The call is, of course, non-binding for anyone. Although
the final statement agreed that developed countries should take the lead with
at least US$300 billion annually by 2035 for developing countries for climate
action, it is not guaranteed, nor are specific sources, responsibilities, or
parties. The paragraph mentions "a wide range of sources, public and
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources."
However, this funding will come in the context of "mitigation and
adaptation measures." This paragraph also fails to mention losses and
damages that require double the financing. Clearly, developed countries
continue to evade bearing the high cost.
Paragraph
(c) of the Final Declaration still refers to the "voluntary intention of
the Parties" to account for all climate-related external flows and climate
finance mobilized by multilateral development banks. Developing countries have
again failed to make financial contributions by developing countries to
developed countries a duty and a right, not a "voluntary" endeavor.
The
text of the Final Declaration also mentioned grants and highly concessional
financing to adapt and respond to loss and damage, suggesting that most of this
financing could be through concessional loans rather than grants as was
previously provided for in relevant international agreements.
The
latest text approved in Baku determined the parties that would benefit from the
various forms of funding. It said they are those countries "particularly
vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change, such as the least
developed countries and small island developing states" (and not
developing countries in general). Here, it attempts to balance adaptation and
mitigation in funding according to the historical demand of developing
countries, as 80% went to mitigation and 20% to adaptation while considering
mitigation funding as an "investment" from countries rich in
renewable energy technology that is sold at the highest prices to developing
countries. It is managed by the private sector and comes under the title of
"investment funding" and not compensation from rich countries
responsible for climate change to developing countries that suffer climate
disasters without being a primary contributor to emissions!
In
conclusion, there was close to a consensus on disappointment with the latest
text approved regarding the new collective quantitative goal for climate
finance (NOCQ) and many other issues. The discussions of the ministers and
heads of delegations did not only help to bring the views closer together on
these projects. They all stuck to their preferred options through a long list
of paragraphs, reaching dozens of pages, until they were suddenly shortened by
the presidency on the second day of extension.
Differences
in opinion did not stop at financing. They extended to the Just Transition
Action Plan (PTTJ), the Mitigation Action Plan (PTA), Article 6 of the Paris
Agreement on carbon trading, the Global Strategy for Adaptation (GAO), how to
implement the Global Stocktake (WB), response measures, their type, technology
transfer, and many other points on which there was no significant progress.
Many parties found the great focus on financing and neglecting the remaining
negotiating themes out of place. The topics should have been discussed and
approved in an integrated basket because they are integrated in their impact.
Furthermore,
the most effective and serious topic, approved for the first time at the Dubai
Summit last year, was related to "the shift away from fossil fuels,"
which had been categorically rejected from the agenda and discussion. However,
COP29 was expected to determine the implementation and regulatory framework for
moving away from fossil fuels by specifying the mechanisms, timeframes, and
required procedures, such as when to gradually stop exploration and extraction,
what compensations are there for countries that leave these materials
underground, and other procedures and compensations required for a fair
transition to renewable energy. The Arab civil society paper in this regard
called for changing the dominant civilizational model and coexisting with the
idea of living with less energy, especially in rich countries with high and
exaggerated consumption at all levels under the title of "luxury," at
a time when more than 1.18 billion people around the world still lack access to
energy.
Some
at COP29 cheered the successful adoption of carbon credit quality standards or
the so-called rules for using carbon markets, a necessary prelude to launching
a global "carbon market." In 1997, the head of the US delegation, Al
Gore, proposed carbon trading as a way for developed countries to avoid
responsibility for the failure of the Kyoto Protocol and as an excuse not to
reduce their emissions. This trade, included in paragraph six of the Paris
Climate Agreement, allows major countries that do not want or are unable to
reduce emissions that cause climate disasters to carry out small projects in
developing countries to withdraw carbon, such as reforestation or forest
protection, and to add it to their balance in reducing emissions. While
reforestation projects are mostly folkloric, major countries prefer to pay a
small amount to developing countries for semi-illusory projects that do not
affect emissions reduction rather than retreat from their destructive
civilizational and industrial model or their globalized companies losing any
profit. Some considered this topic's approval on the first day of the
conference as an attempt to please the United States and its newly elected
president, who is known for opposing the Paris Agreement.
Practically,
a deep gap would appear between emissions and methods of addressing climate
change when calculating the size uprooted from the Amazon and its surroundings
since 1997 for the cultivation of soy, which is considered one of the most
vital animal feeds for increasing meat production to serve the massive
consumption of meat in Europe and the US, especially for the manufacture of
"hamburgers" and "fast food." Moreover, the impact of
methane gas produced by raising cows is 36 times more influential on the
climate than carbon dioxide gas. Emissions from intensive agriculture worldwide
constitute more than 25 percent of global emissions.
However,
agriculture did not receive the necessary attention at COP29, except in some
workshops and launching websites on the effects of climate change on farming.
Nonetheless, industrial, commercial, and intensive agriculture and animal
husbandry significantly impact global emissions (25 percent of emissions),
predominantly methane gas resulting from animal husbandry and industrial
fertilizers that generate nitrous oxide emissions, which is 200 times stronger
than carbon dioxide. These issues should have been discussed.
It
was easy to notice the participation of representatives of major international
food and agricultural companies in Baku. Most of them joined their countries'
official delegations, although they represent meat, food, pharmaceutical, and
agricultural fertilizer companies. Their intensive mobilization prevented the
discussion of issues such as reducing meat production, limiting deforestation
to grow animal feed, curbing the use of fertilizers and agricultural
pesticides, and controlling intensive farming and agriculture. It was the same
pressure they imposed at the Biodiversity Summit held recently in Colombia and
the exact role historically played by fossil fuel companies in climate summits.
In
politics, the Argentine president's decision to ask his country's delegation to
withdraw from the summit was also significantly impacted. It was an indication
of harmony with the skeptical position of US President-elect Donald Trump,
especially when he described the climate issue as a "socialist lie"!
Some considered this position a prelude to withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement. Other sources expected that Trump could withdraw from the UN Climate
Change Organization and stop its funding from the US.
The
Baku conference witnessed the beginning of discussions about the need to change
the negotiation strategy for countries and the UN, especially the idea of
consensus and unanimity in decisions. Some began calling to proceed with
decisions and procedures that most countries agree upon. However, this idea was
considered risky without binding climate agreements or global repercussions for
non-compliance or deviation from the consensus or agreements. But what if Trump
surprised the world by withdrawing from the UN Climate Organization and ending
its support and funding?
COP29
ended without a significant development that would change the course of events
and expectations. However, better results could come from the meeting, which is
expected a week after COP29, when key stakeholders will again meet at the
International Court of Justice in The Hague for long-awaited hearings on
states’ climate change obligations. While the ICJ's advisory opinions are not
legally binding, its assessments, as the UN’s principal judicial body, provide
authoritative guidance on the nature and scope of state climate change
obligations under international law. It will also provide a clear legal
standard (including on the rights of future generations) that will feed into
national and regional court cases and UN climate negotiations.
The
Arab Negotiating Group held almost daily coordination meetings. However, it
could not move beyond defending the interests of oil-producing countries and
being unconcerned with the mitigation issue. There is fear that it will become
part of the historical responsibility for climate disasters if it does not
change its actual negotiating policies and pressure developed countries to pay
and compensate and change their economic policies and destructive
civilizational model. Nevertheless, the Group agreed on many fundamental
issues, such as the need to apply the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility, without proposing a review of the definitions related to
developing countries and rich countries classified since 1992 or that of
bearing the extended historical responsibility and the new one with countries
such as China, which has become the first in global emissions and the global
economy, as proposed by the Arab civil society paper.
However,
the above situation does not prevent reopening dialogue and discussion between
relevant international conferences and rethinking principles, negotiation
strategies, and alliances. This year's civil society position paper received
widespread attention from the media participating in the COP, especially the
Arab ones, despite the small size. It also opened this usually silent
discussion in climate negotiations and between countries. It has become
necessary with the growth of disasters and new yearly records in almost
everything.
In
the outcome of the Baku Climate Summit, the parties failed to agree on several
issues, including the dialogue on implementing the results of the global
inventory, the Just Transition Action Program, the progress, effectiveness, and
performance review of the Adaptation Committee, the Second Review of the
Standing Committee on Finance, the Seventh Review of the Financial Mechanism,
the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism,
Additional guidance on the characteristics of nationally determined
contributions, the Report on the Annual Dialogue on Global Stocktaking that
guides the preparation of nationally determined contributions, and Procedural
and logistical elements of the global stocktaking process in general.
Disagreement also remained on the different roles of the governing bodies of
the Convention and the Paris Agreement.
There
was disagreement on other issues, such as whether to proceed with the GST
outcomes, particularly on the energy transition. Many groups and countries
expressed disappointment at the lack of agreement in Baku, especially given the
importance of the next round of nationally determined contributions, to be
submitted in 2025, to avoid exceeding the 1.5°C target.
Additional
Information:
A- The
Baku Climate Change Conference was held between 11 and 22 November 2024 in
Baku, Azerbaijan, with an additional two-day extension on 23 and 24 November.
The Conference constituted the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
nineteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), the sixth meeting of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
(CMA 6), and the sixty-first sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA 61) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI
61).
B- In
total, 66,778 people registered to attend the conference, including 33,158
country delegates, 13,386 observers, 3,575 members of the media, and 14,473
support and secretariat staff. Among the observers, 1,880 were volunteers from
Azerbaijan, the host country. Another 3,975 people, including 157 country
delegates and 3,818 observers, registered to participate online. The number of
participants from civil society, academia, companies, and the private sector
was not identified!
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